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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a framework 
based on Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Theory” and is used to help identify causal factors that 
lead to human error. The framework has been used in a variety of industries to identify 
leading contributing factors of unsafe events, such as accidents, incidents and near 
misses. While traditional application of the HFACS framework to safety outcomes has 
allowed evaluators to identify leading causal issues based on frequency, little has been 
done to gain a more comprehensive view of the system’s total risk. This work utilizes the 
concept of event severity along with the HFACS framework to help better identify target 
areas for intervention among unsafe events in wind turbine maintenance.  
The objective of this work was to determine if there are any relationships between 
the certain HFACS causal factors and an incident’s severity. The analysis was based on 
405 cases which were coded for contributing factors using HFACS and were rated for 
actual and potential severity using a 10-point severity scale. Models for predicting 
potential and actual severity were generated using logistic regression. These models were 
then validated using actual data. Although the findings were not significant, it was 
determined that decision errors and preconditions to unsafe acts: technological 
environment were major contributors to events with high potential severity.  
One limitation of this work was the limited availability of complete data on which 
to conduct the analysis. So, while the analysis produced non-significance, it is anticipated 
that as more data becomes available, the models will yield more concrete findings. 
Regardless, understanding the relationships among incident causal factors and outcomes 
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may shed light on those causal factors which have the potential to lead to catastrophic 
events and those which may lead to less severe events.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether determining which stock to sell to achieve the greatest financial reward 
or deciding where to focus this year’s budget for the purchase of safety equipment for 
your workforce, Risk Management (RM) is a practice adopted by many both formally 
and informally. With regards to industrial safety, RM is a refined discipline and generally 
considers the identification, assessment and prioritization of hazards and their 
consequences in an effort to strategically and effectively minimize the risk through the 
introduction of certain interventions. As such, effective RM does not just address the 
resulting outcome, like number of lacerations among a given population, but rather aims 
to address the “root cause(s)” which ultimately contributed to the outcome.  
One way of helping to identify the “root causes” or contributing causal factors of 
an unsafe event is by using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS). This framework has been used successfully by a number of industries to 
identify common latent causal factors in the organizations’ safety performance. Most 
often, incident and accident cases are reviewed and classified using the HFACS 
framework only to generate an overall list of the most frequently occurring causal factors 
(both active and latent). While targeting interventions toward these high-frequency causal 
factors may prove effective, using this method there is no way to distinguish between the 
magnitude of each event. For instance, the highest occurring causal factor may be a skill-
based error in the form of slips, trips, or falls. As a result, resources may be diverted and 
allocated to addressing this single issue. However, further analysis reveals that the 
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severity or consequences of these slips, trips, or falls are minimal and are only resulting 
in minor scrapes and bruises. Meanwhile, other less frequent but more catastrophic events 
go un-noticed simply due to the low frequency of occurrence. This example highlights 
the need to incorporate another parameter, incident severity, into the evaluation process 
which will 1) provide a more detailed picture of safety performance in an organization 
and 2) enable managers to better identify target areas for intervention.  
It is anticipated that certain levels of incident severity are generally influenced by 
a common set of similar active and latent causal factors (according to the HFACS 
framework). The question becomes, what causal factors are common to high-severity 
incidents, medium-severity incidents, and low-severity incidents? And, can we predict 
the severity of an incident given an existing set of causal factors?  
   
1.1 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a predictive model for determining the 
actual and potential severity of a future incident as a function of existing HFACS causal 
factors.   
 
1.2 Motivation 
This model should be developed for the following reasons: 
1) Future high severity accidents can be prevented by identifying and fixing root causes.  
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2) A standard methodology can be developed which fully utilizes the potential of HFACS in 
order to develop probabilistic models. In the literature so far, this approach has not been 
taken. 
3) Management decisions can be aided by determining the causal categories which attribute 
to an increase in probability of high severity. Efforts can thus be directed towards fixing 
causes which result in higher severity incidents.  Having statistically significant causal 
factors makes decision makers trust the means to fix them. 
4) The overlooked near accident cases can be fully utilized. Most incident reports have 
higher proportion of near accident cases than actual accidents. Authors so far have only 
considered actual severity for developing prediction models, which is based on accidents. 
Also, there have not been any established procedures that help rate potential severity. A 
basic framework for rating potential severity will be established. 
 
1.3 Thesis Layout 
The first chapter will begin with some basic definitions and terminologies. This 
will be followed by a discussion on the topic of risk and risk assessment. The theory of 
human error will be discussed briefly. There will be discussions on the topic of severity. 
Then, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) will be reviewed. 
These will be the human factors components used in this study. Mathematical tools have 
been used for determining the relationship between causal factors and incident severity in 
this study. Hence, logistic regression techniques and the various terminologies associated 
with them will be discussed in chapter three.  
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The methodology that will be used for this study will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. The methodology section will include all the stages in which this study was 
conducted, with details of each. The last chapter is results and conclusion, where the 
results of this study will be presented. Also, limitations of this study and future research 
will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, some basic definitions and terminologies related to accident 
investigation and safety engineering will be discussed.  
 
2.1 Basic Definitions 
In his work for measuring accident severity, Davidson (2004) has compiled the 
following definitions of important terms in safety: 
Accident: “An undesired event that results in harm to people, damage to property 
or loss to process. It is usually the result of a contact with a substance or a source of 
energy above the threshold limit of the body or structure.”(Bird & Germain, 1989, p.36) 
Near accident: “An event which, under slightly different circumstances would 
have resulted in harm to people, damage to property, or loss to process.” (Bird & 
Germain, 1989, p.36) 
Incident: An incident comprises of an accident or a near accident. “In a broader 
loss control definition, it refers to an event which could or does result in a loss.” (Bird & 
Germain, 1989, p.36) 
 
2.2 What is a risk? 
 The classical definition is that risk (for example, of an accident) is the product of 
the probability of that event and (a unified measure of) the (assumed negative) 
consequences that necessarily accompany that event (Sheridan, 2008). Other definitions 
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of risk state that, risk is the probability or likelihood of an injury or death (Christensen, 
1987). The notion of risk involves both uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage that 
might be received (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). All these definitions formulate risk as 
product of probability and consequence or severity. Sheridan (2008) argues that, risk R 
with the following formula:  
    ∑ 	 	|   	. 
In this case, PE is the event probability and the remaining term explains the 
consequences of all events that could occur, given that the initial event occurs. Here, Ci is 
the consequence. 
 For an incident E to occur, three other probabilities are taken into account. The 
first is the probability of opportunity or exposure to a hazard. The second is attributed to 
human error, and takes into account the probability of this error to occur when presented 
with the opportunity or exposure. Lastly there is the probability that there is no recovery 
to favorable conditions, given the error occurs. Hence, the probability of this unfavorable 
outcome is the product of the three probabilities (Sheridan, 2008):              

    |
     | 
The term  is the term  used earlier in the definition of risk. 
This equation explains the importance of the opportunity or exposure, for an unfavorable 
outcome to occur.  
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 In the equation for risk R, the term Ci is consequence or severity.  There is a 
difference between the terms risk, hazard, and uncertainty. As already stated, uncertainty 
and damage constitute risk, and uncertainty is just the probability that the desired event 
may not occur as planned. Hazard is a source of danger, while risk is the possibility of 
loss or injury. Kaplan and Garrick (1981) further theorized a relationship between a risk 
and a hazard: 
   ! "#$ . 
This equation states that risk is a ratio of hazards and safeguards. There is always 
a small chance of a desired event or activity to have an unfavorable outcome. Thus, risk 
can be reduced to an infinitesimal value by increasing safeguards, but never brought 
down to zero, because a hazard always exists.  
Risk analysis answers the following questions: What can happen? How likely is it 
to happen? If it occurs, what are the consequences (Bedford & Cooke, 2001)? The basic 
method of risk analysis is the identification and quantification of scenarios, occurrence 
probabilities and consequences. Risk, from the context of industrial safety, can be viewed 
as a set of scenarios, each with a specific probability of occurrence and quantifiable 
impact of consequences (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). The emphasis here is to model a 
specific system (wind turbine maintenance) and construct a mathematical model that 
links the accident causation factors and the accident severity. In order to achieve this, it is 
important to quantify accident severity. 
 
2.3 Techniques for risk assessment 
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  The method to measure risk and categorize risk involves the use of certain 
‘first-order’ approaches (Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006). These are technical, 
economic, cultural and psychometric approaches. The technical approach considers risk 
as being primarily about seeking safety benefits in such a way that, the acceptable risk 
decisions are a matter of correct engineering.  In this approach, science is given prime 
importance in investigating, analyzing and implementing safety and risk issues. Examples 
of this approach include Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) and Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). MORT is fundamentally similar to an event tree. 
On the other hand, the economic approach considers the expected benefit, rather than the 
harm caused, as the main factor for managing risk. The economic approach considers 
hazards as market externalities requiring intervention and social, cultural, political and 
anthropological notions are ignored (Viscusi, 1983). Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is an 
example of the economic approach.  
 Cultural theory approach utilizes an anthropological framework for determining 
how groups in society interpret hazards and embed trust or distrust in institutions that 
create or regulate risk (Douglas, 1992). This is not a quantifiable approach, since it does 
not help predict how individuals will behave in their group, which might lead to hazards. 
The psychometric approach is based on Risk Perception (RP). RP is considered as a 
subjective phenomenon. This approach explains why people perceive hazards differently. 
This approach is considered to be the most influential model in the field of risk analysis 
by Siegrist, Keller and Kiers (2005). In this study, 26 potential hazards were asked to be 
rated not only in terms of severity, also personal factors  such as scientific knowledge of 
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the hazard, dread potential, newness and perceived immediacy of effect. This study 
aimed to establish that individual perception of a hazard is also an important criterion in 
categorizing risk, along with severity and frequency. However, it is difficult to obtain 
data regarding the perception that an employee might have about a hazard before an 
incident occurs. The data used in our study is compiled from an incident report, and each 
and every employee involved in the incident will have to fill in a questionnaire regarding 
their perception of the hazard on the basis of the factors described in the study discussed 
above. There are various approaches to measure and assess risk. Now, some techniques 
for applying these approaches into practice will be discussed. 
A risk matrix is a table where columns are represented by probability of an event, 
frequency or its likelihood of occurrence, and rows represent an event’s severity, impact 
or consequences. Risk is then determined as the product of probability and severity. Risk 
is not a measured attribute, but is derived from frequency and severity inputs through a 
priori specified formulas such as    & ' "  (Cox, 2008). Risk 
matrices provide a clear framework for analyzing risks. They are easy to construct and 
understand. Also, they can easily accommodate for changes to the grid based on specific 
applications. On the other hand, it has been argued that, the construction and use of risk 
matrices does not need special expertise in the field of risk assessment.   
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a technique which considers all 
the ways by which a system could fail and the consequences that could occur with each 
case. Root-cause analysis is used to identify the most responsible cause of the incident 
under question. State transition diagrams describe a system as it moves from one state to 
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another, and limits the system to only one state at a time. An event tree describes the 
transition of the system from an initiating event to subsequent events. There is a 
probability associated with each subsequent event occurring after this initiating event. 
According to first order classification by Glendon, Clarke, and McKenna (2006), these 
techniques fall into the technical approach. The focus in this study is not only to review 
the concept of risk, but also to explore and experiment with the concept of severity. This 
study will utilize the technical and the risk perception approaches for developing a 
mathematical relationship between causal factors and incident severity.  
 
2.4 Severity and the technical approach 
 Every occupational accident has a severity associated with it. The severity may be 
rated according to damage to an employee’s health, or by cost incurred to the 
organization. The severity ratings developed so far take into consideration both these 
perspectives.   
 There are risk matrices which categorize risk according to frequency of an event 
and the impact of the event, as argued earlier. Such matrices indicate event probability on 
one axis and impact or severity on the other, their product categorizing an event of having 
higher risk based on higher impact and probability (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2007). Some authors argue that these matrices have poor resolution; typical risk matrices 
can correctly and unambiguously compare only less than 10% of randomly selected pairs 
of hazards (Cox, 2008). The accuracy in quantifying actual risk is low for risk matrices, 
and should be used as an alternative to purely making random decisions. In the risk 
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matrix technique discussed above, the probability of a particular event can be determined 
quantitatively based on frequency of the event. Consequence or severity, for example, has 
been ‘given’ values between 0 and 1 in the study by Cox (2008). This largely depends on 
the analyst’s perception of the impact of the incident. This is where the risk perception 
theory comes into play. 
Earlier, we discussed FMEA as a technique to analyze risk. FMEA considers the 
system in a binary state: pass or fail. It does not consider intermediate degrees by which a 
system is damaged, but rather the series of events that lead the system to failure. FMEA 
helps investigate all the events leading to a failure, but does not consider how each event 
leading to failure is affecting the system in terms of severity. FMEA hence does not 
register severity on a continuous basis, but rather on a binary basis.  
A state transition probability diagram consists of a large possibility of conditions 
that the state of a system can be over time. A state transition diagram also does not 
incorporate severity of an incident.  Hence, to include severity into these diagrams, one 
will have to imagine large number of states emerging from the current, each having a 
different severity rating. For example, a system can transition from state A to B with 
probability PAB. This new state has a severity s. S can take on a large set of values, and 
hence there are a large number of states B with varying values of severity s. Hence, 
arguably, state transition probability diagrams can more accurately identify the risk of 
potential incidences than the FMEA technique. The same argument can be made for 
event trees. Event trees are used primarily, to determine the root cause of an incident, 
rather than help determine scenarios with varying severity. In the work by Ross (1981), a 
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serious injury fault tree has been constructed to trace the path of events that lead to a 
serious injury. This is like an event tree, but focusing on only serious injuries. Ross 
retraces the path of a serious injury from the time of occurrence backwards. He concludes 
that a designated activity occurs with inadequate operator actions and unfavorable energy 
flow. The above technical approaches help analyze and classify the causes of incidents 
and their severity.  
Currently, researchers have developed several probabilistic models to predict 
severity, given the potential causal factors. This approach for predicting the severity is 
based on the variables involved and a probabilistic model is developed.  Li and Bai 
(2008) have developed a severity predicting model for motorcycle accidents. They 
propose a Crash Severity Index (CSI), which is the likelihood that a fatality will occur 
given a severe crash occurs. This index can take values between 0 and 1, and is 
determined statistically from the work zone variables. The closer the number is to 1, the 
higher the possible severity of injury. In a similar study by Dissanayake and Lu (2002) 
probabilistic models have been used to predict severity. Automobile crash severity in this 
study, has been categorized into five levels: No injury, possible Injury, non-incapacitating 
injury, incapacitating injury and fatal injury. The models developed calculate the 
probability of occurrence of an injury with a particular level of severity. This can be 
better formulated as: Probability [An incident that occurs has a particular severity level]. 
For example, a model has been developed in this study to calculate the probability of an 
incapacitating injury to occur. These models calculate the probability that a higher 
severity incident occurs, given that a lesser severity incident has occurred. For example, 
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if a motorcyclist suffers a serious injury, what is the probability that the injury will be 
fatal? 
 
2.5 Severity Scales 
 Lin, Hwang, and Kuo (2008) have reviewed various medical severity scales. The 
Injury Severity Scale (ISS) and the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) are used by healthcare 
professionals to categorize the trauma faced by their patients (Copes, Sacco, Champion, 
& Bain, 1989). The most common scale is the ISS. AIS uses nine body regions to better 
summarize injury severity caused by multiple injuries. The ISS uses only six body 
regions, instead of nine (Baker, O’Neill, Haddon, & Long, 1974). The ISS scores are 
based on the sum of squares of the highest AIS scores for the top three most severely hurt 
body parts. The ISS scores range from 1 to 75. New Injury Severity Score (NISS) uses 
three most severe injuries independent of whether all three occur in the same region, to 
compute the sum of squares (Osler, Baker, & Long, 1997). These scales, however, lack 
the sensitivity to accurately classify less severe injuries (Lin, Hwang, & Kuo, 2008). 
Based on the part of the body injured and type of injury, physicians can accurately 
quantify trauma. Trauma for physicians is analogous to severity for safety engineers. 
When considering a severity scale, management is interested in determining how 
the severity of the injury will impact the company financially. This may be a combination 
of production time lost, worker compensation claims, and equipment damaged.  This is 
the reason why scales which classify only worker injury trauma; such as an AIS or ISS 
cannot be directly used to reflect cost to management.  
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 A major power generation company has a severity scale which considers injuries 
based on workdays lost. This is 10 point scale with severity increasing from 1 to 10. The 
number of workdays lost has been estimated for each serious severity rating. Critical 
severity ratings 8, 9 and 10 represent permanent disability, fatality and multiple fatalities, 
respectively. Further, two types of severities have been used: potential and actual.  
  Based on the seriousness of the injury, the incident may result in significant 
financial loss to an organization. Many examples of the magnitude of financial loss have 
been reviewed by Asfahl (2005). In one example, the average total cost per worker 
fatality has been estimated as $790,000 (National Safety Council, 1996). The cost to the 
U.S.A.F. for a worker fatality has been estimated as $1,100,000 (U.S. Air Force, 1995). 
The costs mentioned above include the compensation, equipment and investigation costs. 
The U.S. Department of Energy estimates a loss of $1 million per employee fatality 
(Briscoe, 1982). Reportable injuries cost, on an average, $2000 per incident, while a cost 
of $1000 per day lost also has been estimated (Crites, 1995). The estimation of these 
costs comes from the legal and financial paradigm of safety based on the severity of the 
incident (Asfahl, 2005). Hence, the degree by which severity increases according to 
financial loss depends on the injury sustained. Severity scales should show the types of 
injuries, equipment damaged and the corresponding financial loss. 
 Sensitivity of a severity scale depends upon the application for which it is to be 
used. A mining environment, for example, will employ a ten-point scale for the variety of 
medium and serious injuries such as bruises, amputations and electrical shocks. On the 
other hand, a severity scale used for assessing injury to computer programmers may use a 
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less sensitive scale targeted for specific injuries. Hence, a severity scale is environment 
and work specific, and also has the subjective input of the severity rater. Severity has so 
far been quantified by experts and analysts based on their experience and the 
environmental inputs. The Accident Frequency-Severity Chart (AFSC) developed by 
Priest (1996) enables severity to be rated according to the type of injuries, financial loss 
based on injuries and damaged equipment, on the same scale. This scale has been 
developed for high risk outdoor activities. Higher numbers on the scale indicate higher 
degrees of loss. Priest (1996) suggests that the acceptability of these ratings should be 
decided by a committee of experienced personnel in this field; however, these may be 
done individually.  
 
2.6 Potential Severity 
The discussed severity scales measure the severity of accidents. Injuries need to 
occur before cases are rated for severity. There are near accident cases where individuals 
could have sustained serious injuries, but were spared from injury by a very small 
margin. There will be a severity associated with near accidents if they become accidents. 
The situation in which a near accident occurs could result in a major accident in the 
future. Potential severity is the subjective severity rating given to potential losses caused 
by near accidents. The potential losses can be in the form of physical injury, cost of 
damaged equipment or similar degrees of loss. Hence, these situations must be analyzed 
in order to determine the causal factors of near accidents. 
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The concerns that needed to be addressed while rating potential severity included: 
How can we assign a particular type of injury to a particular situation? For example, how 
can we know what type of injury could occur if an object strikes an employee in the head 
with considerable force and velocity? Currently, there is no established procedure for 
rating potential severity. The ratings are given according to the rater’s subjective view 
(Davidson, 2004). A physician can imagine the types of injuries that could occur if near 
accidents become accidents. A safety expert can judge the environmental and mental 
conditions that most likely result in an accident.  A manager can estimate the cost 
incurred if the incident occurs. An employee can be trained to describe the situation as 
accurately as possible. Each near accident should then be reviewed by all four individuals 
and a consensus reached on a potential severity rating. This should be the approach for 
rating incidences for potential severity. 
 
2.7 Human Error 
 Human error has been defined as an inappropriate or undesirable human decision 
or behavior that reduces, or has the potential of reducing, effectiveness, safety or system 
performance (Sanders & McCormick, 1992). Some actions that can be attributed to 
human error would be viewed as appropriate in some systems, until they cause an 
incident and the mistake is discovered (Rasmussen, 1979). Another thought is that, an 
action might become an error only because the action is performed in an unkind 
environment that does not permit detection and reversal of the behavior before an 
unacceptable consequence occurs (Rasmussen, 1982). Human Error can then be defined 
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as an action that fails to meet some implicit or explicit criterion (Sheridan, 2008).  70 to 
80 percent of all accidents in aviation occur, at least partly, due to human error.  
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996).  
Human error has been classified according to type, such as errors of commission, 
omission, sensing, remembering, deciding and responding (Sheridan, 1992). Errors of 
commission are caused by incorrectly performing an act. Errors of omission are caused 
when there is a failure to do something. A sequence error is caused when a task is 
performed out of sequence. A timing error is caused when there is failure to perform a 
task within an allotted time period. Further, some authors have classified error based on 
how information is processed (Rouse & Rouse, 1983). In this system, errors are identified 
as they occur at different stages of information processing. Information processing occurs 
in the following stages: Observation of the state of a system, formulating a hypothesis, 
testing a hypothesis, choosing a goal, selecting an appropriate procedure and lastly, 
execution of the procedure to achieve the goal. When a system is being observed, for 
example, there could be incorrect readings of appropriate state variables, or there could 
be a failure to observe any state variables at all. Further in the process, there may be 
similar errors in hypothesis testing, choice of a goal, choice of a procedure and the 
execution of the procedure. The various types of human error have been classified as 
causal factors to unfavorable incidences in the HFACS. 
 
2.8 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
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The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) has been 
developed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) in order to methodologically categorize 
causes of incidents. A similar approach to HFACS has been to classify errors based on 
the type or the level of behavior involved (Rasmussen, 1982).  These behaviors have been 
classified as skill-based, knowledge-based and rule-based behaviors. Errors in skill-based 
behavior are errors in executing an action. Errors in rule-based behavior are errors in 
correctly applying preset rules to a situation. Errors in knowledge-based behavior are due 
to improper assessment of potential hazards in an unusual situation. An unfavorable 
incident occurs when an employee performs an act that is undesirable in that situation, 
which leads to injury. However, the reason for this failure to act correctly is more than on 
an active level (Reason, 1990). The physical environment, supervision and leadership, 
and the organization as a whole, may also be responsible for the employee to perform an 
undesired action. For example, the work environment may be too dark for an employee to 
perform a given task correctly, which may lead to an accident. Investigating further, one 
could find that the supervisor had not updated the employee on the conditions of the work 
environment. Further, this investigation could find questionable management policies 
responsible.  
In light of the different organizational levels of causality, Reason (1990) proposed 
that there are active and latent failures. Active failures are apparent, and can be quickly 
attributed to have caused the accident. For example, an employee may not be wearing a 
mandatory hard-hat, and a head injury occurs. This is the lowest level in the accident 
causation structure. On the other hand, latent failures are failures which occur at higher 
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organizational levels, such as the ones in supervision and organizational management. 
Latent failures are not apparent at the time of the incident, but come into the spotlight 
once an investigation occurs. Reason compared each level to a swiss-cheese slice, with 
the holes in the slice corresponding to the failure at each level. The accountability for 
each incident can be traced back through the holes in each slice. The failure 
accountability goes higher up the organizational hierarchy as holes in higher level swiss-
cheese slices align.  
Using this as a reference, HFACS was developed to elaborate on both the active 
and latent failures. There are four levels of failure, according to the hierarchy in an 
organization. Failure on the lowermost level is attributed to unsafe acts (refer to Fig.1). 
Unsafe acts include errors and violations. Decision based errors are errors that an 
employee commits due to a consciously thought of action going wrong. For example, an 
employee may use improvised tools or equipment in an unusual situation and an injury 
occur from this action.  
Skill-based errors are caused when an employee performs a task or action with 
inadequate skill. For example, an employee may lift an object with improper technique, 
causing an injury to the back. Perceptual errors are caused when the auditory or visual 
senses do not function correctly due to external influences. For example, an employee 
may misjudge the passing clearance under a wire between two electrical poles and cause 
an electrical arcing incident. Violations are willful and blatant acts against mandatory 
regulations, and may lead to high severity accidents.  
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Fig.1 Unsafe Acts (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) 
Preconditions to unsafe acts is the causal category which explains the creation of 
a hazardous environment which causes an incident (refer to Fig.2). These preconditions 
include slippery work surface, temperature and weather conditions. Faulty and non-
functional equipment also constitute a precondition if they are a part of the technological 
environment before an incident occurs.  
Unsafe leadership is another level of failure further up the organizational 
hierarchy (refer to Fig.3). This includes inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
actions, failure to correct known problem and supervisory violations. All these deal with 
substandard supervision practices at the work environment.  
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Fig.2 Preconditions to Unsafe Acts (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) 
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Fig.3 Supervison (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) 
The highest organizational failure is at the senior management level (refer to 
Fig.4). The failures at this level are related to poor safety culture as a whole. Failures at 
this stage stem from lack of funding, human resources problems such as poor background 
checks on employees and other current company policies. Violations at latent levels 
result in serious consequences on the management.  
 
Fig.4 Organizational Influences (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) 
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The HFACS system hence provides the analyst with a set of all possible causal 
factors that can help identify the causes of the incident. The HFACS causal codes will be 
used in order to accurately identify causal factors of incidences in the selected work 
environment in this study. Organizational influences, precondition to unsafe acts, unsafe 
supervision and unsafe acts are called the four levels of failure (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2000). There are three causal categories, resource management, organizational climate 
and organizational process. These causal categories have been further divided into 
specific causal factors called nanocodes. The specific causes of incidents can be 
identified accurately by referring to a list of nanocodes (refer to Appendix B). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
As discussed earlier, we require specific mathematical tools for developing a model 
which relates incident severity and incident causal factors. Hence, logistic regression 
techniques and terminologies associated with them will be presented in this chapter. 
 
3.1 What is logistic regression? 
 Logistic regression is a regression technique employed to fit accident systems. 
Logistic regression techniques have been used to model probabilistic systems to predict 
future events. These models are direct probability models that have no requirements on 
the distributions of the explanatory variables or predictors (Harrell, 2001).  
 If p is the probability that a binary response variable Y = 1 when input variable X 
= x, then the logistic response function is modeled as:  
  (  1|'  *   +,-+./1 0 +,-+./ 
This function represents an s-shaped curve and is non-linear. Here, β is the 
coefficient of the predictor or input variable x used in a regression equation. A simplified 
version of this function can accommodate for multiple input variables and is linear. This 
function is called the logistic regression function and is superior to the logistic response 
function (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006): 
  1(  12'  *3, … , '6  *67   +.-+,/,-+8/8-9-+:/:1 0 +.-+,/,-+8/8-9-+:/: 
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This equation calculates the probability of the response variable to be 1, given 
multiple predictor variables. This model is still non-linear, and is transformed into 
linearity by using the logit response function. The equation for logistic response function 
then becomes: 
1 ;    +.-+,/,-+8/8-9-+:/: 
The term 63<6 in the above equation is called as the odds ratio of the event. Taking 
the natural logarithm on both sides,  
=$ > 1 ;  ?   @A 0 @3*3 0 @B*B 0 9 0 @6*6 
Since, L.H.S. is a function of x1,…,xp: 
$*1, … , *    @A 0 @3*3 0 @B*B 0 9 0 @6*6 
The above equation is linear and can be used to determine relationships between 
variables of interest.  
Some studies have used logistic regression modeling to determine the relationship 
between crash severity and factors which cause crashes. Dissanayake and Lu (2002) 
determined that presence of certain input variables such as influence of alcohol, point of 
impact and lack of judgment increase the probability of a crash occurring with higher 
severity. A variable contributing to a crash was coded 1, else 0. Severity was rated as a 
non-incapacitating or an incapacitating injury and coded 0 or 1 respectively. P(Y=1) was 
the probability that a crash occurs which results in an incapacitating injury.  
As discussed earlier, Li and Bai (2008) used Crash Severity Index (CSI) as a 
measure of incident severity. They have used logistic regression as a basis of modeling 
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their system. Their approach is similar to that used by Dissanayake and Lu (2002). This 
technique has been used to estimate the influences of driver, highway, and environmental 
factors on run-off-road crashes (McGinnis, Wissinger, Kelly, & Acuna, 1999). It has 
been used to determine the personal and behavioral predictors of automobile crash and 
injury severity (Kim, Nitz, Richardson, & Li, 2000).  Chang and Yeh (2006) used this 
technique to identify the most contributing risk factors for motorcyclist fatalities. In these 
studies, the authors have used the environmental and behavioral causes of the incidences 
as predictors.  
 
3.2 Linear regression versus logistic regression 
In linear regression, the relationship between two variables is in the form of: 
(   0 @' 
In the above equation,   is known as the intercept, or the value of  (  when 
'  0.  @ is known as the slope or the change in ( when ' increases by one unit. The 
method used for estimating the values of   and @ is known as ordinary least-squares 
regression (OLS). This method produces the estimates of all the above terms as well as an 
error term ej. The error term is the difference between the estimate of ( and ( for case j. 
The predicted values of the dependent variable ( are well within the range of possible 
values of ( (Menard, 2001). When the dependent variable is dichotomous, it can carry 
only two values, 0 or 1. Since the variable is coded in a binary manner, the mean of the 
predicted values of the dichotomous variable lies between 0 and 1. Hence, the mean of 
this variable can be interpreted as a function of the probability that a selected case will 
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fall into the higher of the two categories for this variable (Menard, 2001). When the 
dependent variable is dichotomous and OLS regression is used to estimate the terms, the 
predicted values of this dependent variable can exceed 1 or can be less than 0. The values 
of probability always lie between 0 and 1, and OLS regression predicts values of the 
dependent variable that do not fall in this range.   
In logistic regression analysis, the interest is not to directly predict the intrinsic 
value of the dependent variable Y but to determine the probability that an event will 
occur. Y = 1 indicates that the event has occurred, and P(Y=1) indicates the probability 
that it will occur. The problem of having predicted values exceed 1 or be less than zero 
can be avoided utilizing the concept of odds ratio discussed earlier. An odds ratio is the 
ratio of ( = 1 to ( ≠ 1. For example, if the odds ratio is 1.59, then it indicates that an 
observation is 1.59 times more likely to fall in a category Y = 1 than Y = 0. Odds ratios 
cannot have values less than zero, but can have values more than one.  
Hence, OLS cannot be used to determine the probability that an accident will 
occur with a particular level of severity.  
 
3.3 Ordinal logistic regression 
            The response variable can have more than two ordered levels. The interest may be 
to determine the probability that the response will be one of these levels. When there are 
three or more ordered categories of the response variable, ordinal logistic regression 
(OLR) method is used for modeling (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). The dichotomous 
dependent variable in binary logistic regression has two levels, 0 and 1. The ordinal 
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response variable has three or more distinct levels increasing in magnitude. An ordered 
logit model has the form: 
=$ > 3 1 ;  3 ?   DE 0  @F' 
=$ > 3 0  B1 ;  3 ;  B ?   DE 0  @F' 
. 
. 
. 
 =$ > 3 0  B 0  … 0 E 1 ; 3 ;  B ;  … ;  E ?   DE 0  @F' 
OLR is a logistic regression technique that fits two or more regression curves 
simultaneously. The equation series above, for example, indicates the odds of belonging 
to the group represented by ( = 1 against belonging to the groups represented by ( = 2 to 
k. The numbers of equations modeled in this series are the number of ordered categories 
minus one. If ( has 3 ordered levels, the number of equations modeled are 2. Each such 
equation represents its own logit model, and hence the individual equations are called 
logits. The sum of the probabilities from 3 to E is 1. Hence, OLR models cumulative 
probability. One important assumption in modeling with OLR is that, the relation 
between independent variables and logits is the same for in all the equations in the series 
(Norusis, 2008). The assumption implies that the coefficients of the independent 
variables will not vary significantly. Hence, the variable coefficients @F in all the 
equations in the series are the same. However, each equation has a different constant term 
DE.  
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3.4 Measures of a good fit 
3.4.1 Log-likelihood: 
Let the log-likelihood of the model with only the constant term be denoted by L0 
and the one with the independent variables and the constant term be L1. For binary 
logistic regression, the -2 log-likelihood (-2LL) is given by (Menard, 2001): 
GA  HIJ3=K(  1L 0 IJA= K(  0LM 
The -2LL will then be -2 (GA. Here, N are the total number of cases, nY=1 
indicates the total number of cases where Y=1. Also, P(Y=1) is nY=1/N. L1 is represented 
by the same equation, but the values of the terms will be different due to the inclusion of 
independent variables. If the model is fit with the constant term only, it is a subset of the 
model with variables. Hence the former model is said to be nested within the latter. The 
difference in L0 and L1 when multiplied by -2 is interpreted as a chi-square statistic. 
Hence, the difference between the -2LL values of L0 and L1 is interpreted as a chi-square 
statistic. However, the models must be nested for the difference to be a chi-square 
statistic. This statistic if, if denoted by χ2, is given by:  
NB  ;2GA ; G3 
χ
2 tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables in the model are 
zero. Hence, if χ2 is statistically significant (p < 0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the variables enable the model to make better 
predictions than the model without variables.  For an ordinal response variable, the same 
equations are used, but the difference is the type of event probability. In binary logistic 
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regression, it is P(Y=1), whereas in ordinal the value of 1 is replaced by an ordered 
category (Menard, 2001). The values of -2LL should be as small as possible in order for 
the model to be a good predictor. 
 
3.4.2 Cox and Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 
For dichotomous variables, the Cox and Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 statistics 
provide the geometric mean squared improvement per observation (Menard, 2001).  
*   "== B   1 ; PAP3BQ  
RSTUVWUXWU YZ  [\ ; >]^]\?
ZR_ /K\ ; ]^ZRL 
Here, N are the total number of cases. If the model fits the data perfectly, the 
value should be 1, but Cox-Snell R2 statistic does not take this value. The Nagelkerke R2 
statistic adjusts the Cox-Snell R2 statistic to take the value of 1. Both statistics are used 
for measuring the strength of association between dependent and independent variables.  
 
3.4.3 Pearson’s χ2 and Deviance 
For ordinal regression, Pearson’s statistic is used along with Deviance as an 
indication of goodness-of-fit. Both values should be small and the significance values 
large. The large significance value (p > 0.05) indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected 
and the model is a good fit (Norusis, 2008).  
All possible dependent variables are cross-tabulated with the independent 
variable. A row or column is dedicated for each level of every variable. The frequency of 
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cases belonging to ith row and jth column is placed in the observed cell Oij and the 
expected values predicted by the model are placed in the cell Eij (Kanji, 1994). The 
Pearson Chi-square statistic and Deviance is given by the equations (Kanji, 1994; 
Norusis, 2008): 
NB   a a b	c ; 	cB	c
d
cJ3
6
	J3  
]  Z a a efghgJ\
i
fJ\ jk 
efglfg 
There are p rows and q columns to the table, and the degrees of freedom are 
reduced to (p-1(q-1). 
 
3.4.4 Test for parallel lines: 
For ordinal regression, the regression coefficients are assumed to be the same for all 
logits. The test for parallelism checks this assumption. The null hypothesis here is that the 
coefficients of the variables are the same across all response categories. A high 
significance value (p > 0.05) indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. These 
tests have been used in SPSS PLUM and SPSS LOGISTIC REGRESSION procedures 
for checking model goodness of fit and validating model assumptions.  
 
3.4.5 Wald’s statistic 
Wald’s statistic is given by the equation (Menard, 2001): 
mEB  K nE". . # nE LB 
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Here, bk is the variable coefficient value and S.E. is the standard error in 
estimating the coefficient. This statistic can be distributed asymptotically as a χ2 
distribution. Also, it follows standard normal distribution when it is just Wk. This formula 
parallels the t-ratio for variable coefficients in OLS. This statistic checks how well each 
predictor contributes to the model individually. Hence, a statistically significant Wald’s 
statistic for a variable indicates that it should be retained in the model.  
Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) suggest that these significance values should be 
set higher than the conventional levels of 0.05 or 0.1 to values such as 0.2 or 0.25. Many 
authors (Mickey & Greenland, 1989; Bendel & Afifi, 1977) have used this criterion for 
screening variables, since they believe that stricter levels such as p < 0.05 fail to identify 
all the important variables. In a study by Dales and Ury (1978), it was determined that 
setting significance levels well above the conventional values such as 0.05 or 0.1 reduces 
the possibility of a type II error in variable selection.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
The initial chapters laid a foundation for the development of the mathematical 
model to relate incident severity and incident causal factors. This chapter will include the 
step by step procedure which was used for developing this model. Each sub-procedure 
will be discussed before presenting its execution with the given data.  
 
4.1 Selecting cases 
The incident report from a power generation company was used as the source of 
data. This report has more than five hundred cases. Only incidences related to 
maintenance and service activities of the wind turbine generator were considered for 
further analysis. Incidences involving a vehicle or occurring off premises were not 
considered for further analysis.  For the whole data set, 275 of the incidences were 
chosen at random using MINITAB software. The remaining 130 the cases were used for 
validating the model.  
 
4.2 Rating severity 
Each selected case was rated for potential and actual severity. As discussed 
earlier, the involved employee, the physician, the engineer and the manager should reach 
a consensus while rating potential severity. However, it was not possible to assemble a 
team which included the employee involved, the site physician and an on-site safety 
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expert. Hence, for future studies, the suggested methodology can be used. Also, there is 
no established procedure for rating severity in the literature so far.   
An interesting perspective on assigning severity has been highlighted by 
Davidson (2004). Firstly, potential severity ratings were given according to the author’s 
subjective view of what could have materialized out of the perceived hazards at that time. 
Accident Frequency Severity Chart (AFSC) (Priest, 1996) was used to rate actual 
severity. This chart was used as a guiding tool in order to assign a potential severity 
rating.  
This effective technique was used for rating potential severity in this study. The 
AFSC was also used for rating actual severity according to the injuries sustained as 
described in the incident report. The increasing magnitude of severity according to injury 
type has been shown in the adapted AFSC (refer to table-1). This order was followed 
while rating incidences for potential severity. The potential severity was rated for each 
case by the author. Potential severity was also rated for the cases where employees had 
sustained actual injuries. This was done by increasing the actual severity by one or more 
depending on the perceived hazards of the situation as described in the incident report.  
The severity was rated based purely on the possible injury sustained by the involved 
employee.  
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Table 1- Accident Severity Scale (Priest, 1996; Davidson, 2004): 
Severity  
Ranking 
Injury Impact on 
Participation 
1 Splinters, insect bites, stings Minor 
2 Sunburn, scrapes, bruises, minor cuts 
3 Blisters, minor sprain, minor dislocation Cold/heat 
stress 
4 Lacerations, frostbit, minor burns, mild concussion,  
mild hypo/ hyperthermia 
Medium 
5 Sprains & hyper-extensions, minor fracture 
6 Hospital stay  < 12 hours fractures, dislocations, 
frostbite,  
major burn, concussion, surgery, breathing 
difficulties, 
 moderate hypo/ hyperthermia 
Major 
7 Hospital stay  > 12 hours e.g., arterial bleeding,  
severe hypo/ hyperthermia, loss of consciousness 
8 Major injury requiring hospitalization e.g., 
 Spinal damage, head injury 
Catastrophic 
9 Single death 
10 Multiple fatality 
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The incident report included descriptions of the condition in which the incidences 
occurred. These included near accidents as well as accidents involving actual injuries. 
Many cases in the incident report were already rated for severity. The injury ratings given 
for these cases were used to rate for the other cases. For near accidents, the potential 
severity was rated by considering the situation where the employee would have been 
injured rather than just spared from injury. For example, an employee could be on top of 
a three hundred foot high wind turbine tower with inadequate fall protection equipment. 
In such a case, potential severity was given according to the worst possible outcome. For 
this example, the employee could fall from a height which could prove fatal.  
Consistency was maintained while rating cases of similar nature. For example, a 
possible fatal fall from 300 feet was always rated as 9, whereas a possible fall of 20 feet 
was rated as 6 (Please refer table 1). Cases involving other types of injuries were also 
rated in the same manner (refer to tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6). The environmental parameters 
such as falling height, type of object, electric current voltage were given in the incident 
report. However, some cases did not report these important data. For such cases, the 
worst possible outcome was assumed. 
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Table 2- Potential severity assigned to falling objects 
List of falling objects: Potential Severity: 
(Falling height one deck 
20 feet) 
Potential Severity: 
(Falling height 300 
feet) 
Wrench 6 9 
Phone 4 6 
Radio 6 9 
Hydraulic torque wrench 6 9 
Hammer 6 9 
Oil filter and bucket 6 9 
Space plate 6 9 
Hard case 6 9 
Winch nut snap ring 2 4 
Unopened soda can 4 6 
Crane hook 6 9 
Voltmeter 6 9 
Latch handle 6 9 
Piece of crane boom 6 9 
Battery 3 5 
Bolt 2 4 
Nut 2 4 
Slip ring 2 4 
Grease gun 6 9 
 
 
Table 3- Potential severity assigned to slips and falls 
 
Description Potential Severity 
Fall is from height of 300 feet. 
 
9 
Fall is from 20 feet 6 
Employee slips and falls on a hard 
metal surface 
6 
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Table 4- Potential severity for electrical cases: 
 
Voltage Potential severity in case of 
contact with live wire 
Potential severity in case of 
burns sustained from arc 
flashing 
575 9 8 
480 9 6 
400 9 6 
220 9 6 
100 8 6 
24 4 2 
 
 
Table 5- Potential severity assigned to impact cases: 
 
Object(s) Part of body Potential Severity 
Torque wrench Fingers 
Brow 
6 
6 
Wrench Toes 6 
Hatch, Opening Fingers between 7 
Heavy metal parts Fingers between 7 
Stepladder, Own weight Fingers between 7 
Hydraulic wrench 
reaction arm, nut, bolt 
Fingers between 7 
Rotor lock, wrench Fingers between 7 
Heavy cable (suspended), 
ladder rung 
Fingers between 7 
Mast, nacelle Fingers between 7 
Axis cabinet support and 
rotating gear 
Foot 7 
Ladder rung Elbow 
Wrist 
7 
7 
Gearbox Ribs 7 
Buss bar Elbow 7 
Sledge Hammer Single finger 8 
Chisel Knee 7 
Hammer Knee 
Little finger tip 
7 
8 
Torque multiplier Forearm 7 
Hatch Forehead 8 
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Table 6- Potential severity assigned to Real Injuries: 
 
Diagnosed cases: Actual Severity Potential Severity 
Bursitis in the elbow 6 7 
Sprain in the right ring 
finger 
4 5 
Laceration to right thumb 5 6 
15 mm laceration on his 
brow 
7 8 
Contusion to hand and 
foot 
Left hand 
6 7 
Heavy sudden lifting 
damage to the back 
5 6 
Laceration to the back of 
the head 
7 8 
Laceration wound left leg 
(grinding wheel) 
6 8 
Contusion on left maxilla 6 7 
Laceration to the head 
requiring 10 staples 
7 8 
Laceration requiring 
three sutures mid cranial 
back of head 
7 8 
Laceration to the finger 5 6 
Contusion to left ankle 6 7 
3 inch laceration on the 
forehead req. 2 internal 
and 4 external stitches. 
7 8 
Fractured Finger, some 
cuts on the others 
7 8 
Finger crushed, 
thumbnail removed 
8 8 
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Lastly, the incident report also did not include the financial loss incurred for these 
cases. Hence, it was not possible to develop an actual severity scale which incorporated 
both physical injury and the cost to the organization. Hence, both the potential and actual 
severities were rated based solely on physical injuries. 
 
4.3 Arranging data 
MS EXCEL worksheets were used to arrange the preliminary data and assign 
causal categories to each case. The original incident report had each case assigned a 
causal category according to HFACS methodology. Each selected case had a case ID 
assigned in the original incident report. The selected cases with their ID were arranged in 
one column. Individual columns were assigned to the 18 causal categories. Columns were 
also assigned to potential and actual severity.  A 1 was registered in the cell with the row 
representing the case ID and column representing the causal category identified for the 
case. If two causal factors (nanocodes) of the same causal category were assigned to a 
single case, it was only counted once in the corresponding cell. 275 of the cases were 
chosen at random using MINITAB. Data from these cases was used for model 
construction.  
 
4.4 Constructing the model 
There are ten levels by which the actual and potential severities were rated. 
Hence, there were two or more ordered levels by which both types of severities could be 
rated. There were dichotomous variables representing the causal categories and ordinal 
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variables with more than two levels representing actual and potential severity. Ordinal 
logistic regression models determine the probability of an observation to fall into a 
specific group, when there are two or more ordered levels of the dependent variable. 
Binary logistic regression models calculate the probability of an observation to fall into 
one of two groups, when there are two levels of the dependent variable. Hence, it was 
suitable to construct the models using ordinal logistic regression. The initial approach 
was to construct two ordinal regression models, one with actual severity as the dependent 
variable and the other with potential severity. The dependent variables had ten ordered 
levels of severity. The initial models included all the contributing variables (refer to 
tables 7 and 8). However, none of the models passed the test of parallel lines, which 
determines if the variable coefficients are the same for all logits in the ordinal logistic 
regression model (refer to tables 9 and 10).   
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Table 7- Initial Potential Severity Model Parameters 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
[psev = 
.00] 
-5.141 1.703 9.112 1 .003 -8.479 -1.803 
[psev = 
3.00] 
-1.966 1.400 1.972 1 .160 -4.709 .778 
[psev = 
4.00] 
-.554 1.396 .157 1 .692 -3.291 2.183 
[psev = 
5.00] 
.014 1.398 .000 1 .992 -2.726 2.754 
[psev = 
6.00] 
.654 1.400 .218 1 .641 -2.091 3.398 
[psev = 
7.00] 
1.175 1.402 .703 1 .402 -1.572 3.922 
[psev = 
8.00] 
1.595 1.402 1.294 1 .255 -1.153 4.342 
[psev = 
9.00] 
6.564 1.689 15.09
8 
1 .000 3.253 9.874 
[de=.00] .684 .312 4.787 1 .029 .071 1.296 
[de=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[se=.00] .504 .294 2.939 1 .086 -.072 1.080 
[se=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[v=.00] -1.823 .590 9.533 1 .002 -2.981 -.666 
[v=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pte=.00] .371 .271 1.876 1 .171 -.160 .901 
[pte=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[f=.00] 1.310 1.039 1.592 1 .207 -.725 3.346 
[f=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Table 8- Initial Actual Severity Model Parameters 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
[asev = 
.00] 
-3.846 2.367 2.639 1 .104 -8.486 .794 
[asev = 
1.00] 
-2.772 2.359 1.381 1 .240 -7.396 1.851 
[asev = 
3.00] 
-2.000 2.354 .722 1 .395 -6.613 2.612 
[asev = 
4.00] 
-.550 2.356 .054 1 .815 -5.167 4.067 
[asev = 
5.00] 
2.039 2.533 .648 1 .421 -2.925 7.004 
[de=.00] -1.248 .335 13.847 1 .000 -1.906 -.591 
[de=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[se=.00] -.994 .322 9.508 1 .002 -1.626 -.362 
[se=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pte=.00] -.529 .293 3.267 1 .071 -1.103 .045 
[pte=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[f=.00] -1.964 1.050 3.497 1 .061 -4.022 .095 
[f=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pe=.00] -2.454 .836 8.620 1 .003 -4.092 -.816 
[pe=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[ams=.00] 2.109 1.021 4.262 1 .039 .107 4.111 
[ams=1.00
] 
0a . . 0 . . . 
[cc=.00] -2.596 .547 22.485 1 .000 -3.669 -1.523 
[cc=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[is=.00] 2.512 1.443 3.030 1 .082 -.316 5.341 
[is=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Table 9- Initial Potential Severity Model Test of Parallel Lines 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Null 
Hypothesis 
195.373 
   
General .000a 195.373 35 .000 
The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope 
coefficients) are the same across response categories. 
a. The log-likelihood value is practically zero. There may be a 
complete separation in the data. The maximum likelihood 
estimates do not exist. 
 
Table 10- Initial Actual Severity Model Test of Parallel Lines 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Null 
Hypothesis 
171.583 
   
General .000a 171.583 32 .000 
The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope 
coefficients) are the same across response categories. 
a. The log-likelihood value is practically zero. There may be a 
complete separation in the data. The maximum likelihood 
estimates do not exist. 
 
Murad, Fleischmann, Sadetzki, Geyer and Freedman (2003) have suggested 
collapsing categories in order to improve the number of observations in individual 
categories and hence improve model parameter approximations in ordinal logistic 
regression models.  
For potential severity ratings, ten ordered levels were hence collapsed into three 
ordered levels. The values were divided in these three levels. Ratings from 0 to 4 were 
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collapsed into the lowermost level. Hence, the ratings from 0 to 4 were coded as 0. 
Severity ratings from 5 to 7 were collapsed into the middle level and 8 to 10 in the 
highest level. These ratings were coded as 1 and 2 respectively.  
There are 18 distinct causal categories. Each category represents an independent 
variable used in the model. The variables which did not contribute towards the 
occurrence of any incident at all were eliminated from further analysis. These variables 
were pml, sv, oc, fcp and pis (refer to Appendix A.). 
The remaining variables were selected for fitting in further models. The initial 
model for potential severity included all the contributing variables (refer to table-11). 
Variables which had their Wald’s statistic significant at a p-value < 0.25 were selected 
for fitting in the next model (refer to tables-12 and 13). The procedure continued till all 
variables and constants had a significant Wald’s statistic (refer to table- 14).  The final 
model for potential severity included four causal categories (refer to table- 15). The 
models were constructed on SPSS v.17.0. SPSS PLUM ordinal logistic regression 
procedure was utilized for fitting the models. For the variables in the final model, two-
way, three-way and four-way interactions were investigated for their contribution to the 
model.  These interactions were added in the model. There were no cases where five or 
more causal categories were identified at once, and hence higher level interaction terms 
were not included in the models.  
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Table 11- Model 1 Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
[ordinal1 = 
.00] 
1.121 2.867 .153 1 .696 -4.499 6.741 
[ordinal1 = 
1.00] 
2.847 2.874 .982 1 .322 -2.785 8.480 
[de=.00] .834 .353 5.587 1 .018 .142 1.525 
[de=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[se=.00] .474 .325 2.131 1 .144 -.163 1.111 
[se=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pe=.00] .605 .862 .492 1 .483 -1.086 2.295 
[pe=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[v=.00] -1.690 .668 6.395 1 .011 -3.000 -.380 
[v=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[ppe=.00] .401 .334 1.442 1 .230 -.253 1.054 
[ppe=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pte=.00] .552 .299 3.402 1 .065 -.035 1.138 
[pte=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[ams=.00] .238 .596 .160 1 .689 -.930 1.407 
[ams=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[aps=.00] 1.052 1.369 .591 1 .442 -1.631 3.736 
[aps=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[cc=.00] .479 .551 .756 1 .385 -.600 1.558 
[cc=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . 
 
[f=.00] 1.198 1.106 1.174 1 .279 -.969 3.366 
[f=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[is=.00] -1.459 1.035 1.987 1 .159 -3.488 .570 
[is=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . 
 
[rm=.00] .393 .735 .286 1 .593 -1.048 1.835 
[rm=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[op=.00] -.171 1.097 .024 1 .876 -2.321 1.978 
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[op=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
Table 12- Model 2 Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
[ordinal1 = 
.00] 
-1.344 1.820 .545 1 .460 -4.910 2.223 
[ordinal1 = 
1.00] 
.372 1.821 .042 1 .838 -3.197 3.942 
[de=.00] .806 .339 5.653 1 .017 .142 1.471 
[de=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[se=.00] .372 .312 1.424 1 .233 -.239 .983 
[se=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[v=.00] -1.587 .632 6.309 1 .012 -2.826 -.349 
[v=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[ppe=.00] .365 .329 1.235 1 .266 -.279 1.009 
[ppe=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pte=.00] .486 .291 2.779 1 .096 -.085 1.057 
[pte=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[f=.00] 1.113 1.103 1.019 1 .313 -1.048 3.275 
[f=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[is=.00] -1.267 1.003 1.596 1 .207 -3.233 .699 
[is=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Table 13- Model 3 Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
[ordinal1 = 
.00] 
-2.559 1.362 3.528 1 .060 -5.229 .111 
[ordinal1 = 
1.00] 
-.849 1.358 .391 1 .532 -3.512 1.813 
[de=.00] .756 .335 5.075 1 .024 .098 1.413 
[de=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[se=.00] .337 .309 1.185 1 .276 -.270 .943 
[se=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[v=.00] -1.629 .631 6.671 1 .010 -2.864 -.393 
[v=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[ppe=.00] .340 .328 1.076 1 .300 -.302 .982 
[ppe=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pte=.00] .472 .291 2.637 1 .104 -.098 1.041 
[pte=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[is=.00] -1.263 1.002 1.589 1 .207 -3.228 .701 
[is=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Table 14- Variable Selection 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Final Model 
de Included Included Included Included 
se Included Included Not-Included Not-Included 
pe Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
v Included Included Included Included 
ppe Included Included Included Not-Included 
pte Included Included Included Included 
ams Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
aps Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
pml Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
cc Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
f Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
is Included Included Included Included 
pis Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
sv Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
rm Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
oc Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
op Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
fcp Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included Not-Included 
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Table 15- Final Model Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound Upper Bound 
[ordinal1 
= .00] 
-3.466 1.187 8.529 1 .003 -5.792 -1.140 
[ordinal1 
= 1.00] 
-1.765 1.177 2.249 1 .134 -4.072 .542 
[de=.00] .475 .256 3.433 1 .064 -.027 .977 
[de=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[v=.00] -1.845 .596 9.580 1 .002 -3.013 -.677 
[v=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
[pte=.00] .298 .254 1.384 1 .239 -.199 .795 
[pte=1.00
] 
0a . . 0 . . . 
[is=.00] -1.186 .996 1.417 1 .234 -3.139 .767 
[is=1.00] 0a . . 0 . . . 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
There were no high severity accidents that resulted in injuries which could be 
rated between 8 and 10. Hence, the actual severity levels could be collapsed into two 
categories. Actual severity ratings between 0 and 4 were collapsed into the 0 category. 
Actual severity ratings between 4 and 7 were collapsed into the 1 category. The variable 
representing actual severity now consisted of two ordered levels. Hence, a binary logistic 
regression model with the binary levels of actual severity was fit with the causal 
categories as independent variables (refer to table- 16). Only the variables which had 
their Wald’s statistic significant at p < 0.25 were selected in the final model. The final 
model for actual severity consisted of only three significant variables (refer to table- 17). 
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The interaction effects between these variables were also added to this model. SPSS 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION procedure was used for testing interactions. 
Table 16- Pilot Model for Actual Severity 
 
Variable β S.E. Wald df Sig. 
de .503 .566 .790 1 .374 
se .407 .540 .570 1 .450 
pe 1.977 1.006 3.865 1 .049 
v .252 .854 .087 1 .768 
ppe .486 .501 .941 1 .332 
pte .078 .486 .026 1 .873 
ams -.717 1.136 .398 1 .528 
aps 1.906 1.490 1.637 1 .201 
cc 2.235 .643 12.074 1 .001 
f -18.859 23152.665 .000 1 .999 
is -18.857 17912.582 .000 1 .999 
rm -18.778 14292.210 .000 1 .999 
op -19.362 23152.665 .000 1 .999 
Constant -2.518 .581 18.781 1 .000 
 
Table 17- Final model for actual severity 
 
Variable β S.E. Wald df Sig. 
pe 1.724 .935 3.396 1 .065 
aps 2.129 1.429 2.221 1 .136 
cc 2.129 .572 13.856 1 .000 
Constant -2.129 .204 109.384 1 .000 
 
4.5 Validating the model 
The cases used for validation were the remaining 130 not used earlier for 
constructing the model. Each case had been rated for potential and actual severity. The 
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probability that a case with given input variables has a particular potential severity rating 
was determined using the formulae in table 18 (Norusis, 2008): 
Each case where one or more of the variables from the group de, is, pte and v 
were identified as causal categories could provide the inputs 0 or 1 for the equations. 
Cases where these variables were not identified as causal categories were not selected for 
validation, since this meant that the coefficients of all the variables in the equations 
would be zero. The eliminated variables have coefficients which are not significant 
statistically, and hence do not contribute to the model. Cases were categorized as being 
correctly predicted if the calculated probability was above 0.85. For example, (refer to 
table- 19) for a particular case, v was identified as a causal category and the severity 
rating given belonged in the middle level (potential severity between 5 and 7). The low 
probability calculated (0.35, <0.85) classified this case as not correctly predicted.  
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Table 18- Probability Formulae(1) 
 
Probability Formula 
P(severity 
of an 
incident 
will be in 
a specific 
category j)  
 
  > # o   p== n  $ = o   =  q ?;   # o   p== n  $ = o q 
P(severity 
of an 
incident 
will be in 
categories 
less than 
and equal 
to j) 
 11 0 <rs<+/      t 
 
                                                                                                                             
P (severity 
of incident 
will be 
between 0-
4) 
 11 0 <K<u.vww<A.vxyz{-3.|vy}<A.B~|6{-3.3|w	L 
P (severity 
of incident 
will be 
between 5-
7) 
 K 11 0 <K<3.xwy<A.vxyz{-3.|vy}<A.B~|6{-3.3|w	L;  11 0 <K<u.vww<A.vxyz{-3.|vy}<A.B~|6{-3.3|w	LL 
P (severity 
of incident 
will be 
between 8-
10) 
 
 1 ; 11 0 <K<3.xwy<A.vxyz{-3.|vy}<A.B~|6{-3.3|w	L 
 
* 
αj : Constant value in for the categories j @ : Variable coefficient 
x : Variable value (Either 1 or 0). Variables were de, v, pte and is. 
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Table 19- Model validation examples: 
Case Given  
potential 
Severity 
 rating 
Collapsed 
potential 
Severity  
group  
Given 
Ordinal 
category 
Predicted probability that 
severity will  
be between 
 
Correctly 
Predicted? 
0-4 5-7 8-10 
1 4 0-4 0 0.165 0.355 0.480 No 
2 8  8-10 2 0.02 0.077 0.903 Yes 
 
In another case, the causal category de and severity rating belonging highest level 
(severity between 8 and 10) was given.  The high calculated probability value (0.903, > 
0.85) classified this case as being correctly predicted for potential severity.  
For the actual severity model the probability of belonging to the highest group 
(probability of severity between 4 and 7) was calculated using the equation in table- 20 
(Menard, 2001). The procedure used for the validation of the potential severity model 
was also applied for validating the actual severity model.  
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Table 20- Probability Formulae (2) 
 
General Formula 
                                                  
(  1   r- +,,-+,,-9- + 1 0  r- +,,-+,,-9- +  
P(severity of 
incident will be 
between 4 and 7) 
 
(  1   <B.3B~- 3.xBv6{-B.3B~6 - B.3B~ 1 0  <B.3B~- 3.xBv6{-B.3B~6 - B.3B~  
P(severity of an 
incident will be 
between 0 and 3) 
 
(  0  1 ;  <B.3B~- 3.xBv6{-B.3B~6 - B.3B~ 1 0  <B.3B~- 3.xBv6{-B.3B~6 - B.3B~  
 
* 
α : Constant value  @ : Variable coefficient 
x : Variable value (Either 1 or 0). Variables were pe, aps and cc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this section, the results of this study will be presented along with its limitations. 
Future works will be discussed based on the lessons learnt from this study. 
 
5.1 Results 
 
The various measures of model fitting discussed earlier were used as indicators of 
how well a model fits the data. The final potential severity model had four variables 
(refer to table- 14). Each variable had statistically significant Wald’s statistics. The test 
for common slopes was statistically insignificant (p>0.05). Hence, the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the variables are the same across all the logits could not be 
rejected (refer to table- 23). The intercept (constant) values for both the logits showed 
statistically significant Wald’s statistics at a p-value of 0.25. Also, the Pearson Chi-
square and Deviance Chi-square values are statistically insignificant at a p-value of 0.05 
(refer to table- 22). The null hypothesis that the model does not fit is rejected, and model 
is a good fit with the chosen variables (refer to table- 21). In the validation stage, it was 
determined that the potential severity model could predict 35% of the validation cases 
correctly. However, the model correctly predicted 87% of the cases whose severity was 
between 8 and 10. Hence, this model can be utilized to determine the probability of high 
potential severity for incidents. 
The variables included in the final model for potential severity were decision 
error, violation, preconditions to unsafe acts: technological environment and inadequate 
supervision. Decision Error and preconditions to unsafe acts: technological environment 
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need to be investigated and safety interventions targeted in order to prevent high potential 
severity incidents in the future. These variable coefficients are positive, and hence the 
presence of these two causal categories increases the probability of an incident occurring 
with higher potential severity (refer to table- 15). 
For the final actual severity model, all three selected variables had Wald’s 
statistics statistically significant at a p-value of 0.25 (refer to table- 17). The likelihood 
ratio chi-square statistic has a p-value < 0.05. Hence, the hypothesis that model variable 
coefficients are zero can be rejected, and the model with the variables fits significantly 
better than the model without the variables (refer to table- 25). The high -2LL value 
indicates that the model fits the data poorly and the low Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R2 
statistic values indicate a small improvement per observation from the null model (refer 
to table- 24). The actual severity model could not correctly predict the probability of 
belonging to the higher group (probability of severity between 4 and 7) or the lower 
group (probability of severity between 0 and 3) for any of the validation cases. The cutoff 
here was also 0.85, as assumed in the case of potential severity models. Hence, the actual 
severity model cannot be used for predicting the actual severity of incidents. More 
incidences need to be reported and the model re-fitted. 
There were no interaction terms whose Wald’s statistics were found to be 
statistically significant at a p < 0.25 level, for both the actual and potential severity 
models. Hence these models only included the main effects.  
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Table 21- Model Fitting Information (Final Model) 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Intercept 
Only 
69.429 
   
Final 48.088 21.341 4 .000 
 
Table 22- Goodness-of-fit (Final Model) 
 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 9.869 12 .627 
Deviance 11.461 12 .490 
 
Table 23- Test of Parallel Lines (Final Model) 
 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Null 
Hypothesis 
48.088 
   
General 44.233 3.855 4 .426 
 
Table 24- Final Model Summary: 
 
-2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
200.974a .057 .105 
 
Table 25- Omnibus tests of final model parameters: 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 16.241 3 .001 
Block 16.241 3 .001 
Model 16.241 3 .001 
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5.2 Conclusion 
In this study, a relation between the HFACS causal categories and incident 
severity has been modeled using logistic regression. Causal factors that result in high 
severity incidents have been identified.  
The potential severity model can be used as a tool to calculate the probability of 
high severity incidences. In addition, causal factors which contributed significantly 
towards incidences with high potential severity were found to be decision error and 
preconditions to unsafe acts: technological environment. The coefficients of the variables 
decision error and preconditions to unsafe acts: technological environment were found to 
be positive. Having these causal categories increases the probability of potential severity. 
Having a negative coefficient for one of the variables reduces calculated probability of 
response (Norusis, 2008). Some authors have concluded that having a negative variable 
coefficient tends to reduce the calculated probability in logistic regression (Dissanayake 
& Lu, 2002).  
Violation and Inadequate supervision were found to have negative variable 
coefficients. Also, having these variables in the potential severity model reduced the 
probability of potential severity. For example, having a decision error increases the 
calculated probability of potential severity between 8 and 10 by 0.049, while a violation 
reduces the probability by 0.378. The amount change in probability per variable is 
reflected by the value of the coefficients. For example, decision error changes the 
calculated probability more than precondition to unsafe acts: technological environment 
and their coefficient values are 0.475 and 0.298 respectively.  
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One of the core assumptions in HFACS is that when a causal category is 
attributed towards an incident, it is responsible partially or fully for that incident to occur. 
Though the variables attribute towards causing the incident, they may impact the severity 
differently. The negative variable coefficients for violation and inadequate supervision 
indicate that these causal categories reduce the calculated probability of potential severity 
between 8 and 10. Hence, the presence of these variables actually reduces the probability 
that an incident may occur with a high severity. When there are several causal categories 
for an incident, some may impact the outcome more significantly than others. As it has 
been found earlier, a violation tends to reduce the probability of potential severity by 
0.378 while a decision error increases it by 0.049. Hence, the presence of some causal 
categories changes incident severity more than others and some increase the probability 
of severity while others reduce it. 
The actual severity model was not a good fit with the data, and none of the 
severity levels correctly calculated the probability for the validation cases. Hence, this 
model cannot be used for calculating the probability of severity.  
By identifying such critical causal factors, management will be boosted in the 
decision making process. Managers can give higher priority for fixing the important 
causal factors. The developed procedure can be used for predicting severity of future 
incidents for any work environment. HFACS is a universal classification system which 
can be applied to multiple work environments. Logistic regression techniques have been 
successfully applied for predicting actual vehicle crash severity (Dissanayake & Lu, 
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2002; Li & Bai, 2008) and also in determining causal factors that lead to high severity 
incidents in coal mines (Maiti & Bhattacherjee, 1999). The work done in this thesis also 
extends this application to wind turbine generator maintenance activities. In addition, the 
HFACS system has been used successfully in conjunction with the concept of potential 
severity.  
One of the drawbacks in using logistic regression is that, data from previous cases 
is required for modeling. Hence, a large number of incidences need to occur in the 
environment of interest in order to construct the model. Also, probability of severity 
cannot be determined for incidences with causal categories are not represented by the 
variables in the final models.  Further, the criterion used in variable selection of p < 0.25, 
though supported by previous work in this field (Mickey & Greenland, 1989), will be 
doubted by researchers who utilize the traditional value of 0.05. 
  When new incidents are added to the report, the data changes and hence, new 
models need to be fit for the new data. Hence, the next step is to develop an application 
which works on a dynamic level by fitting new models automatically and immediately 
when the incident report changes. Secondly, the severity rated by a physician in 
conjunction with a safety engineer and the involved employee would be more accurate in 
terms of damage sustained to the human body and the potential environmental hazards. 
Hence, in future studies, both types of severities need to be rated for each case with the 
consent of all involved personnel. There has not been an established procedure to rate 
potential severity. These drawbacks can be eliminated by developing new techniques 
which can be used for similar studies in the future. 
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5.3 Future research 
5.3.1 Dynamic model 
Once the model is validated using the methodology presented in this paper, it can 
be used for making future predictions. However, if new incidences occur, the data in the 
incident report changes and hence new models need to be fit. A constant revision of data 
should also trigger a constant revision of the model fitting process. This process is shown 
in the flowchart below (refer to Fig. 5):            
 
                                     Fig. 5 Dynamic Model 
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When the database is modified, a trigger starts the methodology for fitting the 
model as discussed in this study. A change in the incident report triggers the statistical 
software to follow the model fitting methodology. If the models are a good fit, the 
validation program is triggered. Otherwise, random samples are chosen till the model fits 
satisfactorily. The output can then be interpreted by the user. Hence, the next step is the 
development of a dynamic model where new changes in the incident report trigger a 
series of programs which fit new models.  
Also, once the model had been validated, an interface can be developed which 
returns the severity probability once the user inputs causal categories. This can be 
performed in the following manner: 
At stage 1 in the figure, the incident report database is modified by simply adding 
a 1 in the cells with the column representing the identified causal category and the row 
representing the newly added case ID. Also, potential and actual severity ratings are 
added in their respective columns for the new case. Once, this occurs an internal program 
triggers the external statistical software to commence stage 2. 
The methodology discussed in this study can be programmed into the statistical 
software, and all the steps can be executed in the correct fashion. Stage 3 commences 
once all statistical criteria are verified and the model is a good fit. Otherwise, the model 
repeats stage 2 till a good fit is found. A custom application can be programmed or a 
current statistical package customized. 
The validation process discussed in this study can be customized with a statistical 
package or a separate customized software developed. This process will be triggered at 
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the end of stage 2. The output can then be interpreted by the user. An interface can be 
developed for the output. The user checks the causal factors using the checkboxes. The 
generate button runs the dynamic model. The output severity levels change as new data is 
fit, and the interface will reflect these changes. This process is shown in the flowchart 
below (refer to Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6 Interface model 
5.3.2 Potential severity rating procedure 
There has not been an established procedure for rating potential severity in the 
literature so far. In previous literature, the potential severity has been rated according to 
 65
an author’s subjective opinion based on the conditions of the incident at that time. In this 
thesis, potential severity was rated based on the incident description, an actual severity 
scale and the author’s subjective analysis. These subjective ratings may be questioned by 
decision makers for their validity. This makes the ratings less trusted and their use 
questioned for further analysis.  This is a drawback that needs to be eliminated. Hence, a 
basic framework needs to be established for rating potential severity. The following step-
by-step procedure is proposed (refer to Fig. 7): 
 
Fig. 7 Potential severity rating procedure 
The incident is reported to the safety engineer by the employee involved. The site 
physician, safety engineer and employee hold an on-site meeting where the incident 
occurred. The employee now describes the event in detail, according to best recollection. 
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The employee describes the objects involved, and the energy flows. Also, the position of 
the employee at the time of the incident is determined.  
Next, the safety engineer and the physician discuss the gathered information. The 
safety engineer determines how the environment would have affected the employee in 
terms of energy transferred. Energy flow and type have been given importance in 
analyzing risk by Ross (1981). For example, it could be thermal in the form of hot 
apparatus, electric in the form of live equipment, in the form of direct impact with an 
object or a combination of the three. The most probable areas of the body where energy 
of that magnitude would have transferred are determined. 
Further, the site physician determines the possible injuries suffered if the involved 
employee was contacted in the probable body regions by the energies of that magnitude. 
Out of the possible injury-body part combination, the physician selects the one that 
results in most severe injury. The physician rates severity on a ten point scale based 
solely on physical injury to the employee. The safety engineer and physician have 
another discussion to ensure they agree on the rating. 
The possible workdays lost from the injury are reported by the physician and the 
possible equipment damaged is reported by the safety engineer to the site or plant 
manager. Manager calculates the cost to the organization in the event of the incident, 
based on cost of lost production time and repairs or installation of new equipment. The 
manager rates the severity of the incident based on possible financial loss. The two 
ratings are multiplied to combine the effects of both types of severities. This new 
potential severity rating can be written in the form of: 
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New potential severity rating              
  Potential severity Rating based on physical injury 
 Potential severity rating based on inancial loss 
This new potential severity rating can truly combine severity associated with 
physical and financial loss. These methodologies can be applied in future studies which 
use logistic regression techniques for calculating severity probability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69
A. Variable Information 
Variable Variable 
Abbreviation 
Unsafe Act: Decision Error de 
Unsafe Act: Skill-based Error se 
Unsafe Act: Perceptual Error pe 
Unsafe Act: Violation v 
Precondition: Physical Environment ppe 
Precondition: Technical Environment pte 
Precondition: Adverse Mental State ams 
Precondition: Adverse Physiological State aps 
Precondition: Physical/Mental Limitation pml 
Precondition: Communication and Co-ordination cc 
Precondition: Fatigue f 
Supervision: Inadequate Supervision is 
Supervision: Planned Inadequate Operation pis 
Supervision: Supervisory Violation sv 
Organizational Influences: Resource Management rm 
Organizational Influences: Organizational Climate oc 
Organizational Influences: Organizational Process op 
Supervision: Failure to Correct Known Problem fcp 
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B. List of Nanocodes 
 
Failure Level Unsafe act 
Causal Category Decision error 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
Improper use of PPE 
Incorrect or absence of PPE 
Improper use of tool/equipment 
Incorrect tool/equipment 
Inappropriate procedure 
Inadequate knowledge/information 
Exceeded ability 
 
Failure Level Unsafe act 
Causal Category Skill-based error 
 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
Omission of step 
Incorrect operation/handling of tool/equipment 
Equipment drop 
Bad habit/practice 
Attention failure 
Slip, trip, or fall 
Improper use of winch/hoist 
Lifting, lowering, absence of bag, tearing of bag 
 
Failure Level Unsafe act 
Causal Category Perceptual error 
 
Nanocode 
Loss of balance 
Misjudged distance, altitude, clearance, size 
Due to visual illusion 
 
Failure Level Unsafe act 
Causal Category Violation 
Nanocode Failure to use PPE 
Violation of orders, regulations, SOPs 
 
Failure Level Preconditions to unsafe acts 
Causal Category Physical environment 
 
 
 
 
 
Weather; Extreme heatWeather; extreme cold 
Weather; Ice 
Weather; Rain 
Weather; Snow 
Weather; Windy 
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Nanocode 
 
Weather; Fog 
Slippery surface 
Poor housekeeping/cleanliness/congestion 
Inadequate lighting 
Presence of hazardous/toxic substances 
Inadequate ventilation 
Altitude 
Terrain 
Unsafe environment created 
 
Failure Level Preconditions to unsafe acts 
Causal Category Technological environment 
 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
 
Danger zone 
Congested/tight space 
Inappropriate equipment/tool 
Equipment/tool/space design 
Lifting 
Repetitive motion 
Improper posture 
Inappropriate procedure 
Improperly maintained tool/equipment 
3RD party equipment/procedure failure 
 
Failure Level Preconditions to unsafe acts 
Causal Category Adverse mental states 
 
 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
 
Mental fatigue 
Circadian dysrythmia 
Complacency/boredom 
Distraction 
Overconfidence/arrogance 
Stress 
Get-home-it is 
Apathy 
Sense of entitlement 
Task saturation 
Rushing 
 
Failure Level Preconditions to unsafe acts 
Causal Category Adverse physiological states  
 
 
Nanocode 
Physical fatigue 
Illness/sickness 
Intoxication/under an influence 
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Effects of medications 
Failure to meet rest requirements while on duty 
 
Failure Level Preconditions to unsafe acts 
Causal Category Physical/Mental States 
 
 
Nanocode 
Physical limitation 
Visual limitation 
Hearing limitation 
Insufficient reaction time 
Inadequate experience for complexity of situation 
 
Failure Level Preconditions to unsafe acts 
Causal Category Coordination, communication and planning 
 
 
Nanocode 
 
Lack of/poor communication or feedback 
Lack of planning/preparation 
Lack of leadership 
Lack of decision-making 
Lack of/poor assertiveness 
Workload management 
 
Failure Level Preconditions to Unsafe Acts 
Causal Category Fitness for duty 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
Failure to meet rest requirements 
Self-medicating 
Overexertion while off duty 
Poor dietary practices 
Pattern of poor risk judgment 
Inadequate preparation, skill, or knowledge 
Off duty injury 
 
Failure Level Supervision 
Causal Category Inadequate Supervision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
 
Failed to provide guidance/oversight 
Failed to track qualifications 
Failed to track performance 
Perceived lack of authority 
Failed to provide adequate rest period 
Lack of accountability 
Failed to provide information/data/ instructions 
Over-tasked/untrained supervisor 
Failed to provide adequate training/on-the-job experience 
Inadequate delegation/prioritization of tasks 
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Inadequate provision of PPE 
Excessive tasking/workload 
Inappropriate employee scheduling 
Failed to plan for adequate employee rest 
Failed to provide adequate briefing time /supervision 
 
Failure Level Supervision 
Causal Category Failed to correct problem 
 
Nanocode 
Failed to initiate immediate corrective action 
Failed to report a hazard/problem 
Failed to correct a hazard/problem 
 
Failure Level Supervision 
Causal Category Supervisory Violation 
 
 
Nanocode 
 
Knowingly provided inadequate information/ data/instructions 
Authorized unqualified employee for work 
Knowingly failed to enforce rules and regulations 
Knowingly violated procedures 
Willful disregard of authority 
Falsifying documentation/records 
 
Failure Level Organizational Influences  
Causal Category Resource Management 
 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
 
Insufficient manpower for task 
Inadequate training/qualification system 
Employee selection process 
Lack of funding/excessive cost-cutting 
Failure to correct known design flaws 
Material resource unavailable 
Material resource inappropriate 
Conflicting or too much information/data 
Inadequate prioritization 
3rd party non-compliance 
 
Failure Level Organizational Influences 
Causal Category Organizational Climate 
 
 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
Policies 
Norms versus rules / policies 
Values, beliefs, attitudes, morale 
Peer pressure 
Communication 
Accessibility / Visibility of supervisor / lead 
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 Delegation of authority 
Formal accountability for actions 
Promotion 
Unstable workforce (hiring, firing, retention) 
Drugs and alcohol 
Time / quota pressure 
Organizational Structure 
 
Failure Level Organizational Influences 
Causal Category Operational Process 
 
 
 
Nanocode 
 
Instruction inadequate or unclear 
Instruction not documented / available 
Information / data inadequate or unclear 
Information / data not available 
Revision process long / complicated 
Communication of change inadequate 
Reward / recognition / incentives 
Monitoring and checking of resources, climate, and processes 
inadequate 
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